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The purpose of this report is to describe and assess the performance of Western Australia’s 
eight port authorities.2  The context for this research is a February 2006 report by Access 
Economics prepared for the Australian Council for Infrastructure Development (AusCID) (A 
Scorecard of the Design of Economic Regulation of Infrastructure, July 2006).  This report 
aimed to rate “the extent to which the regime [for third party access] in each jurisdiction is 
designed in a way that is likely to foster good decisions and outcomes”; it explicitly did “not 
rate the decisions, or outcomes, of each jurisdiction’s regulatory regime or the industry that it 
regulates”.  In this very limited context it rated Australian ports generally as “poor”, and those 
in Western Australia as “very poor”.  The AusCID report appears to have taken no account of 
the regulatory framework for port authorities in Western Australia (WA) contained in the Port 
Authorities Act 1999 (WA) and elsewhere, or the ways in which this framework and its 
application are “likely to foster good decisions and outcomes” (Access Economics 2006, p i).   
 
In light of this apparently incomplete analysis, it is appropriate to describe and assess the 
relevant governance framework applying to WA ports and to assess their performance, so as 
to place the comments concerning them made by the Access Economics report in an empirical 
performance-based context.   
 
The current research reported here has three dimensions: 
 
• It describes and examines the regulatory and policy context in which WA’s port 
authorities operate, including the Port Authorities Act 1999 and other relevant 
legislation and policy directives of governments.  
• It reports empirical performance data for the eight ports governed by the Port 
Authorities Act 1999. 
• It uses performance indicators to assess the performance outcomes of these ports, 
including their financial performance and relevant physical measures of output and 
service to principal stakeholders.  As far as practicable this examination covers the 
twelve years from 1993-94 to 2004-05. 
 
2. Port Authority functions and economic impact 
 
For an island nation such as Australia, ports serve as vital gateways to the global economy.  In 
an increasingly competitive world economy Australia’s economic performance depends more 
than ever on access to efficient distribution networks, of which ports are an integral 
component. 
 
The powers and responsibilities of public port authorities vary widely, from ‘landlord’ at one 
extreme to ‘comprehensive’ at the other (Goss, 1990b).  A ‘landlord’ authority exercises 
overall control over the port and may plan and promote its development, but relies on private 
                                                 
1   The authors would like to thank Mr Sarjit Singh, Murdoch University, for research assistance with this 
project. 
2   Albany, Broome, Bunbury, Dampier, Esperance, Fremantle, Geraldton and Port Hedland. 
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enterprise to conduct most activities connected with the port.  By contrast a ‘comprehensive’ 
authority directly undertakes the majority of activities within the port, including employing 
the workforce, providing stevedoring services (loading and unloading vessels), and promoting 
the port’s services to shippers and ship owners.  In Australia, landlord ports, where the 
authority rents or leases land sites to private firms and exercises overall control, have 
predominated.  However, the term ‘landlord’ is misleading in that it implies a relatively 
passive role for a port authority which is inappropriate in a competitive world economy.  The 
world’s most successful port ‘landlords’ have in reality acted as ‘strategic managers’ and 
undertaken pro-active leadership roles in port management and development (Meyrick, 1998). 
 
Port authorities in Western Australia (WA) have adopted the ‘strategic manager’ model, 
aiming to ensure that all facilities and services in their respective ports are provided 
efficiently, and that the rate of investment in new capital assets is sufficient to cater for 
growing demand.  Port assets are in mixed public and private ownership.  Access to port 
infrastructure, land and services by third parties (e.g. stevedores and providers of towage and 
container storage services) is undertaken through negotiation of commercial contracts 
between users, service providers and infrastructure owners.  Port authorities in WA also have 
strong roles in ‘trade facilitation’, including supply chain coordination and development 
(Charlton 1995). 
 
Major ports in WA, including all those in this study, are publicly owned.  Governments in 
WA have consistently rejected ‘corporatisation’ and ‘privatisation’ in favour of 
‘commercialisation’ (Tull, 1997).  Historically the majority of ports in Australia – and until 
recently virtually all worldwide – have been publicly owned, owing to the perception they are 
natural monopolies and that public ownership can potentially prevent abuse of their market 
power.  Significantly for this research, Goss (1990a; 1990b) has shown that public ownership 
does not necessarily prevent such abuse; specifically, that economic rents can be obtained by 
a number of port-based actors, either singly or in combination, including public port 
authorities, private stevedoring firms operating within ports, and/or port workers (via 
restrictive work practices and overstaffing).  Statutory ‘regulation’ in some form, including 
port governance arrangements, might therefore be necessary to prevent excessive rent 
extraction by port authorities. 
 
Since the 1980s there has been a worldwide trend for governments to reduce their direct role 
in public utilities such as ports.  By contrast, in Australia reform of port authorities has 
focussed on commercialisation, corporatisation and ultimately (in only a small number of 
cases) privatisation.3  Only Victoria and South Australia have privatised previously publicly-
owned ports; Geelong and Portland were sold in 1996 and all of South Australia’s significant 
ocean ports were sold to Flinders Ports Pty Ltd in 2001.  Privately-owned ports also exist in 
Queensland, in particular the Dalrymple Bay coal loading port.  The empirical outcomes of 
infrastructure privatisation have been widely documented in a range of countries and 
industries, but there is relatively little empirical evidence specifically on ports and even less 
which is specifically aimed at evaluating the outcomes of the non-privatisation models for 
port reform (Brooks 2005) which have predominated in Australia.  
                                                 
3   ‘Commercialisation’ involves clarifying the objectives of port authorities by requiring them to operate on a 
more commercial basis, in particular with regard to financial outcomes and freedom from government direction; 
‘corporatisation’ involves commercialisation plus the restructuring of port authorities as separate legal entities 
accountable for clear financial and other objectives, governed by Boards appointed on the basis of their expertise 
with clear powers and functions; ‘privatisation’ can take a variety of forms but generally involves the sale or 
long-term lease of infrastructure and or operational assets to the private sector. 
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The UK has the largest proportion of privately-owned ports, with about 70% of port capacity 
in private hands.  Since privatisation began the UK government has effectively left the 
running of the industry to market forces, subject to state regulatory policy that aims to “add 
value rather than unnecessary cost” (House of Commons Transport Committee 2003), and 
central government involvement in port planning and development has been largely absent 
since the demise of the National Ports Council in 1981 (Reveley and Tull 2002).   
 
However, a number of concerns have been raised about the performance of UK’s privatised 
ports, including the efficiency of planning processes, the lack of publicly available statistical 
information on port activities and performance and the adequacy of health and safety 
regulations.  The UK Government’s distribution strategy now emphasises sustainability, 
intermodal integration, environmental protection and better regional and local planning rather 
than privatisation, competition and deregulation (Department for Transport 1999). 
 
Australia’s intergovernmental National Competition Policy Agreement (1995) aimed to 
produce a coordinated approach to competition reform, with a primary but not exclusive focus 
on the public sector.  However, for infrastructure involved in export trade, the experience of 
competition reform, in particular regulation of third-party access, has not been uniformly 
successful.  
  
Clearly, seaports are vitally important economic infrastructure: more than 99% of Australia’s 
exports by weight (79% by value) leave Australia by sea (Exports and Infrastructure 
Taskforce 2005).  The infrastructure services provided by ports are especially important in 
WA, in which the economy is highly exposed to international trade.  In 2005-06 the State’s 
exports totalled over $38 billion or more than 30% of the national total.  WA is especially 
dependent for its prosperity on commodity exports, the competitive performance of which 
depends on the efficient operation of complex multi-modal supply chains. The services 
provided by ports are key components in these national and international supply chains.  
Fremantle is one Australia’s four key ports for international container trade; WA’s largest 
bulk ports (Port Hedland and Dampier) provide services for very large-scale export of iron 
ore.  The latter two ports are the only ones in Australia handling over 100 mt per annum. 
 
According to a study carried out in 1999-2000 by Fremantle Ports (the trading name of the 
Fremantle Port Authority) for the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE) and 
the Association of Australian Ports and Marine Authorities (AAPMA), the direct and flow-on 
effects of activity in the port of Fremantle accounted for some 5,700 jobs (0.8% of total WA 
employment); the annual economic output from the port, taking into account the direct and 
flow-on effects, was estimated at $728 m annually (0.9% of Gross State Product); total trade 
handled through the port was valued at $13.7 billion p.a.(1998-99) (Fremantle Ports 2000). 
 
3. AusCID-sponsored assessment of the economic regulation of Australian ports 
 
3.1 Background and purposes of the AusCID-sponsored report 
 
The AusCID-sponsored assessment by Access Economics 2006 of infrastructure regulation 
was narrowly focused and based solely on analysis of legislation and regulatory frameworks.  
The sole concern was with the design of regimes for economic regulation intended to 
implement Australia’s 1995 National Competition Policy affecting the behaviour of public 




… is on economic regulation which directly sets prices or revenue for access to, or use 
of, services provided by infrastructure owners …. The focus is on scoring the enabling 
legislation and other guidelines underpinning each regime against good regulatory 
design principles. [emphasis added] (Access Economics, 2006, pp i-ii) 
 
The AusCID-sponsored report therefore did not examine the myriad of legislative means 
other than competition law by which the behaviour of port owners may be controlled in the 
interest of their users and other stakeholders, including the community at large.  Nor did it 
examine the regulation of privately-owned port-based service providers such as stevedores 
and towage operators, despite considerable evidence that significant market power may be 
enjoyed by them (see for example Productivity Commission 1998).  Ownership of public or 
private infrastructure is not stated to be a factor in the assessment, and the report states that 
“public ownership does not necessary [sic] have to go hand-in-hand with poor regulatory 
design” (p 10). 
 
The value of the report’s findings is therefore limited by its acknowledgement that its 
assessment of regulatory design is unsupported by any established need or by any 
examination of outcomes.  In this regard, the report’s authors acknowledge that:   
 
… economic regulation should only be used where there is evidence of persistent 
structural impediments to achieving efficient use of, operation and investment in 
infrastructure by relying on market mechanisms alone. (p 6)   
 
However, as previously stated, the Access Economics report says that:  
 
… its scorecard does not rate the decisions, or outcomes, of each jurisdiction’s 
regulatory regime or the industry that it regulate. (p i) 
 
This exclusion from the assessments by the AusCID-sponsored report should also be read in 
the light of comments by the Exports and Infrastructure Report (2005, p 2) that 
 
The greatest impediment to the development of infrastructure necessary for Australia to 
realise its export potential is the way in which the current economic regulatory 
framework is structured and administered.  It is adversarial, cumbersome, complicated, 
time consuming, inefficient and subject to gaming by participants. … regulatory issues 
are slowing down investment in infrastructure used by export industries.  
 
3.2 The AusCID-sponsored assessment 
 
In reporting on the specific factors taken into account in its assessments, the AusCID 
sponsored report states that: 
 
Good decisions and outcomes are those which encourage efficient resource allocation 
by appropriately balancing the need of investors to earn a reasonable rate of return on 
capital and the interests of infrastructure users to obtain services at minimum feasible 
cost. (p i) [Emphasis added] 
 
Four specific design features are listed in relation to ports: 
 
• Independence from government, industry and other stakeholders  
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• Focus on efficient resource allocation 
• Transparency, predictability and consistency of regulatory processes 
• Accountability of regulatory processes. 
 
The AusCID-sponsored report rated the overall regulation of ports in Australia as ‘poor’ (the 
table below is extracted from the report, p 10; shading added).   
 
 
WA received an overall ‘very poor’ rating.  This is apparently a consequence mainly of 
perceived lack of independence (due to public ownership of port infrastructure in the state) 
and absence of direct regulation of competitive access to port infrastructure (due perhaps to a 
perceived lack of transparency).  This assessment appears to take no account of other 
legislation available to government to achieve desired outcomes, in particular those relating to 
‘focus’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’.  As indicated previously, it also takes no account 
of actual performance outcomes. 
 
Those states in which the report’s assessment criteria indicate there are ‘high performers’ are 
South Australia and Victoria.   Perhaps not coincidentally, these are the only states which 
have wholly or partially privatised their ports4:   
 
In these States the prices charged for port services are monitored by an independent 
regulator with the option for port users to seek relief under an access regime if 
commercially negotiated prices cannot be agreed upon. (p 10) 
 
It appears likely the regulatory policies in those states were motivated by the desire to ensure 
that the newly privatised ports did not exploit their monopoly powers to extract excessive 
economic rents.  Pointing to the significance of outcomes in any assessment of regulatory 
arrangements, it is significant in this regard that a recent evaluation of port reform in Victoria 
was critical of the state’s regulatory regime for ports, arguing that it “has not delivered an 
overall reduction in costs to shippers” and had “created a less than level playing field between 
Victorian ports, favouring those in private ownership” (Victorian Department of 
Infrastructure (DOI), 2001, pp 73, 80 & 84-5).  It also concluded that the regulatory 
framework had reduced the capacity of publicly-owned ports both to undertake new capital 
expenditure and also to provide for the maintenance of existing assets.  It had also encouraged 
expansion of non-regulated services.  The DOI assessment found that regulation did not 
consider service outcome performance measures and was narrowly focused on price caps for 
prescribed services.  In this regard, it found there was some evidence that it had 
                                                 
4   For background see ESCOSA (2004), Regulation of South Australian Ports. Information Paper.    
Jurisdiction: NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT Overall  
Criteria:          
Independent  Poor  V.Good  Poor  V.Good  Poor  Poor  Poor  Fair  
Focussed  Poor  Good  Poor  Good  V.Poor V.Poor  V.Poor  Poor  
Transparent  V.Poor  V.Good  Poor  V.Good  V.Poor V.Poor  V.Poor  Poor  




V.Poor  Good  Poor V.Good  V.Poor V.Poor  V.Poor  Poor 
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disadvantaged some stakeholders not using prescribed services; for example, from 1997 to 
2001 Melbourne Port Corporation increased its non-regulated land rents from 28 per cent to 
35 per cent of total revenue, the highest of the four capital city ports.   
 
4. Port regulation and governance in Western Australia 
 
This section of this report assesses the governance and policy framework in which WA’s port 
authorities operate and the performance this framework has achieved.  The aim has been to 
assess how well it is achieving “efficient use of, operation and investment in infrastructure”, 
which was acknowledged by the authors of the AusCID-sponsored report (p 6) to be a key 
criterion for assessing the need for formal direct regulation.  The assessment here examines 
three principal areas: 
 
• The full range of State legislation available to the state government for managing the 
performance of WA’s publicly-owned port infrastructure and for regulating the 
behaviour (including pricing) and accountability of port infrastructure managers.  
• The financial performance of WA port infrastructure, to assess whether there is 
evidence of excessive (or inadequate) financial returns. 
• The service performance outcomes produced. 
 
4.1 Economic regulation 
 
The assessment criteria used by Access Economics in the AusCID sponsored research would 
require a regime for economic regulation providing rules for a ‘negotiate/arbitrate’ process, 
both to facilitate access to the port by ‘third parties’ wishing to use port infrastructure, e.g. 
stevedores, pilots, other land users and service providers, and to regulate prices charged to 
these and other port users, e.g. wharfage. 
 
There is no formal direct regulation of ‘third party access’ to port infrastructure in Western 
Australia or of pricing for the use of port infrastructure.  In WA an independent body, the 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA), was established in 2004 to administer industry-
specific legislation regulating third party access to electricity, gas, rail and water 
infrastructure (the ERA’s legislative charter does not include ports).  However, the state 
government may request the ERA to inquire into matters relating to both regulated and non-
regulated industries, including pricing, quality, business practices and compliance costs.  In 
relation to the regulation of prices, to prevent excessive extraction of economic rent by port 
owners, relevant provisions exist in statutory governance arrangements (see below). 
 
4.2 Governance of port authorities in Western Australia 
 
Legislation provides a ‘commercial’ governance framework for WA part authorities.  The 
Port Authorities Act 1999 establishes and governs the business of WA’s port authorities and 
provides for the state government to appoint governing authorities and key staff and to control 
prices and investment.    
 
Focus, transparency and accountability 
 
Several features of the Port Authorities Act 1999 provide partial responses to the assessment 
criteria used in the AusCID-sponsored report, in particular its strong focus on efficient 
resource allocation, transparency and accountability.  The 1999 Act was a major advance in 
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standardising the objectives and accounting standards of WA ports.  It repealed the Port 
Functions Act 1993 and seven other pre-existing port authority statutes to create a common 
approach to port authority management.  Some elements of commercialisation had earlier 
been applied to Fremantle and Bunbury.  In 1995 the government had spelled out the role of 
the Fremantle Port Authority (FPA), “to facilitate trade in an efficient and commercial 
manner”, and in 1996 approved formal commercialisation of the FPA and the Bunbury Port 
Authority.   
 
Sections 30 and 34 of the Port Authorities Act 1999 prescribe the functions of port authoriies: 
 
• To facilitate trade within and through the Port and plan for future growth and 
development of the port 
• To undertake or arrange for activities that will encourage and facilitate the 
development of trade and commerce generally for the economic benefit of the State 
through the use of the Port and related facilities 
• To control business and other activities in the Port or in connection with the operation 
of the Port 
• To be responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the port 
• To be responsible for the maintenance and preservation of vested property and other 
property held by it 
• To protect the environment of the port and minimise the impact of port activities on that 
environment. 
• To act in accordance with prudent commercial principles [and] endeavour to make a 
profit (Section 34) [emphasis added] 
 
Significantly, the Act omits any requirement for the Dampier Port Authority to earn a profit: 
 
The functions of the port authority include recovering as far a possible, the cost of the 
facilities and services provided by the port authority from the users of those facilities 
and services (Schedule 6, 1.9). 
 
In respect of the ports of Dampier and Port Hedland the Act also provides for major users 
(mining companies) to nominate directors for appointment to the boards of these authorities.   
 
Annual reports are also required to fully disclose key financial accounting policies and 
outcomes, and report key performance measures.  Notably, privatised entities, including ports 
in Australia, New Zealand and the UK, provide substantially lesser disclosure of financial and 
non-financial targets and outcomes.   
 
According to WA’s Department for Planning and Infrastructure: 
 
The [1999] Act commercialised port authorities with an intent to better equip them to 
respond to market forces and thereby facilitate trade.  The Act intended that ports be 
given the freedom to control the day-to-day running of the port, while allowing 
Government to retain strategic control, including the ability to set performance goals 
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and broad limits for capital expenditure and to control the range of activities 
undertaken.6 
 
In addition to the requirements of the Port Authorities Act 1999, port authorities must also 
comply with a wide range of regulations including state and national competition laws 
governing competitive behaviour (including competitive neutrality), infrastructure planning 
and building codes, financial audit and reporting and environmental legislation.  Annual 
reports are tabled in Parliament and provide generally good disclosure of financial and non-
financial performance.  
 
In practical terms ports have moved a substantial distance in response to ‘commercialisation’, 
both in terms of changing business models and in their financial and non-financial outcomes 
(see below).  Beginning in the 1990s, Fremantle Ports commenced a long-term program of 
business process and ‘cultural’ reform to improve its economic and financial performance 
(Sanderson 2007).  After 1996 Fremantle Ports contracted out many services including 
pilotage, maintenance of stevedoring equipment and forklift driver training.  Outsourcing 
subsequently became accepted practice at all WA ports.  Restructuring and contracting out 
caused the FPA’s staff numbers to reduce from over 750 in 1990 to less than 200 ten years 
later (by the early 2000s staff numbers at Fremantle were creeping up again).  Significantly, at 
Albany, in response to the requirements of the 1999 Act “the Board formed the view late in 
2003, that a return to the direct employment of staff would give greater control over 
productivity, safety and training, at the same time, offering career paths for greater job 
satisfaction”.  Albany now directly employs its maintenance and general operations staff 
(Albany Port Authority, Annual Report, 2003-04, p 3).  
 
All of the above statutory provisions are “likely to foster good decisions and outcomes”, to 
borrow words from the AusCID-sponsored report (see the quotation at the top of page 4 
above).  This is even if their value may be compromised by powers of Ministerial approval 
and direction – an inevitable consequence of the limited ‘commercialisation’ model.  The WA 
government has restricted the autonomy of its port authorities in a number of areas including 
the appointment of senior staff and retention of a power of veto over charges – arguably a 




As indicated above, the 1999 Act requires port authorities to “act in accordance with prudent 
commercial principles [and] endeavour to make a profit” (Section.34).  Pricing guidelines in 
the Act are consistent with this:  
 
Port charges are to be determined by the port authority in accordance with prudent 
commercial principles and may allow for … the making of a profit [and] depreciation 
of assets. (Section 37)   
 
The Act also requires each port to describe its “pricing arrangements”, the nature, costing and 
funding of ‘community service obligations’ and “performance targets and other measures by 
which performances may be judged and related to objectives”.  Each port is also required to 
prepare and publish an annual Statement of Corporate Intent (Section 60), which must include 
estimates of revenue and expenditure, borrowings and dividends.   
                                                 
6   Source: www.slp.wa.gov.au/statutes/swans.nsf/ PDFbyName/03FFB12DE1A1E936482567 





A key feature of the national competition policy reforms is a requirement for ‘competitive 
neutrality’, that is, government enterprises must face market conditions with regard to 
competition, taxation and the like which are the same as those faced by competing 
organisations in the private sector.   
 
Under the current arrangements, all WA ports are required to pay dividends and income tax-
equivalent payments, as well as payments in lieu of local government rates (Section 82), and 
‘government efficiency dividends’.  Since 2001 all WA port authorities have been required to 
pay 50% of after tax profits as a dividend to the State.  However, a port authority may 
recommend a lower dividend if there exist some extenuating circumstances (an earlier 
dividend policy applying from 1994-95 used a sliding scale dividend payout ratio of 0% to 
30% subject to the level of a port authority's debt ratio).  Between 2001-02 and 2004-05 
inclusive, the WA government also required port authorities to pay efficiency dividends. The 
payment of dividends provides a return on the public funds invested in ports and is consistent 
with National Competition Policy which requires public enterprises to meet expectations 
similar to those required of private sector businesses, which usually return a proportion of 
their surpluses to shareholders as dividends. 
 
Section 60 of the Act requires that where ports are directed to undertake non-commercial 
activities they should receive payments to cover their net cost of these ‘community service 
obligations’ (CSOs).7  The Statutory Corporations (Liability of Directors) Act 1996 (Section 
17) also requires that:  
Where a direction is given under a written law to a corporation by a Minister and the 
governing body determines that … it would not be in the interests of the corporation for 
it to comply with the direction … the governing body is to notify the responsible 
Minister in writing … of its determination and the reasons [why the direction would not 
be in the best interests of the corporation].  
4.3 WA Ports’ performance outcomes 
 
A primary focus of this research has been to measure the actual performance of WA port 
authorities – a measure of their success in meeting the expectations of their stakeholders and 
balancing their competing interests – key indicators of the success of t heir governance 
arrangements.  The areas examined in the remainder of this report are: 
 
• Financial performance indicators: Return on assets; profit margin per cargo tonne; 
dividend payout ratio; current ratio; gearing (debt/equity ratio); and operating profit 
(before tax). 
• Pricing: Revenue per unit of cargo; cost (i.e. expenditure) per unit of cargo. 
• Non-financial performance indicators:  Berth occupancy, turnround times and volume 
of trade, which taken together are key indicators of their proficiency in performing their 
‘facilitation’ objectives. 
 
                                                 
7   Bunbury, the first WA port to receive CSO funding, was paid $85,000 in 2004-05 in return for providing 




To assess these aspects of port performance, we have used ‘performance indicators’, that is 
measures of actual performance compared with pre-set goals related to their outputs and/or 
outcomes (Kearney, 1991).  These are not ‘benchmarks’ comparing the performance of WA 
ports against that of ports elsewhere.  As various port stakeholders (e.g. port users, employees 
and government) have differing interests, it is necessary to examine a range of performance 
indicators covering prices, service quality, profitability, community service obligations and 
employment.  This methodology has previously been employed by Tull and Reveley (2001) to 
evaluate the performance of selected Australian and New Zealand ports.   
 
Table 1 provides a long-term summary of key financial and other non-financial indicators.  
The Appendix at the rear of this report contains detailed data from the eight ports governed by 
the 1999 Act.  Data sources employed include Waterline (Australian Bureau of Transport and 
Regional Economics), publications on the financial performance of government trading 
enterprises (Productivity Commission), and port authority annual reports.  
 
Table 1:  Summary Performance indicators, WA Ports (avg 1993-94 to 2004-05) 
 












Albany 7.0 0.4 85 28.6 
Broome * * NA NA 
Bunbury 7.1 0.3 39 8.3 
Dampier 1.8 * 24 # 8.6 
Esperance 9.9 0.5 46 12.6 
Fremantle 14.7 0.5 26 11.9 
Geraldton 9.9 0.4 50 22.7 
Port Hedland -24.1 0.1 NA NA 
Notes: *= less than 0.1; # = 3 years data only; NA = not available; Coefficient of variation = standard 
deviation/mean x 100.   Source: Appendix A. 
 
The 1999 Act was a major advance in standardising the objectives and accounting procedures 
of WA ports, but inter-port and inter-year performance comparisons are subject to many 
qualifications.  In particular, as many of the indicators are ratios with activity-based 
denominators, variations in trade and shipping activity and in the scope of port authority  
responsibilities need to be taken into account when comparing performance.  Small ports such 
as Albany (which handles only 3 mtpa) are unable to reap the economies of scale created by 
large ports like Port Hedland (which handles over 100 mtpa). Fremantle is the only port which 




Table 1 shows that from 1993-94 to 2004-05, return on assets and profit margins varied 
considerably between Western Australian ports.  The maximum return on assets of 15% does 
not suggest the existence of monopoly rents, although the majority of ports are complying 
with the statutory requirement that they “endeavour to make a profit”. 8     
                                                 
8  The WA Government requires ports to achieve a rate of return on assets between 5% and 8% per annum; only 




Rates of return and profit margin data do not suggest monopoly profits are being extracted 
from WA port operations.  Fremantle consistently reports the highest annual rate of return, 
averaging a commercial 15%, the highest of all WA ports.  This reflects its position as WA’s 
major mixed cargo port and the only one with container handling facilities.  Fremantle is 
followed by Esperance and Geraldton which earned returns averaging about 10%, and 
Bunbury and Albany which averaged about 7%.  Broome is the lowest performer but is 
handicapped by small cargo volumes (about 0.2 million tonnes per annum) and high fixed 
costs from the long jetty needed to cope with the large tidal range.  In 2005 it began a $16.8 
million jetty extension to allow berthing of larger vessels up to 50,000 dwt.  
 
In Geraldton, the rate of return on assets dropped from an average of about 14% p.a. in the 
1990s to about 4% after 2000 while the dividend payout ratio increased.  Geraldton’s 
financial performance after 2002-03 was adversely affected by the $103 million port 
enhancement project, which led to a large jump in the debt/equity ratio. Dampier’s rate of 
return and profit margin declined after 2000, in spite of 58% growth in cargo tonnages from 
60.5 mtpa in 1993-94 to 95.8 mtpa in 2004-05, although another key financial indicator, the 
current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities) improved during this time.  By 
contrast, Bunbury’s financial performance appears to have improved since 2000 with a 
declining debt/equity ratio and improving current ratio.  Port Hedland’s performance was 
distorted by a $134 million deficit in 2000-01 caused by the write-off of channel and dredging 
costs; if this year is excluded the rate of return is still low but positive at 3 per cent per 
annum.   
 
Turning to profit margin per tonne of cargo (1989-90 prices), Fremantle and Esperance both 
averaged $0.50 per tonne, closely followed by Albany and Geraldton at $0.40 per tonne and 
Bunbury at $0.30 per tonne.  Since 2000 Bunbury, Esperance, Fremantle and Port Hedland 
have maintained their profit margins in real terms.   
 
As indicated above, an adverse effect of privatisation in Australia and other countries has 
been to reduce transparency, i.e. the scope and quantity of information available on port 
performance.  For example, South Australian ports are no longer monitored by the 
Productivity Commission. 
 
In 2004-05 South Australia’s sole port operator privately-owned Flinders Ports reported a rate 
of return on assets of 12.0%, an operating profit of about $16 million, profit per tonne of 
cargo of $0.92 and a dividend payout ratio of 97.5 per cent.9  By comparison, in the same year 
WA’s most profitable port, Fremantle, earned a slightly lower rate of return on assets 
(10.5%), a similar operating profit ($16.5 million) and a lesser profit per tonne of cargo 
($0.65); its dividend payout ratio was a much lower 40.1%, suggesting that more cash was left 
in the business to assist with investment in new capital for upgrading of facilities and for 
future growth.10  Flinders Ports’ stronger profit performance suggests there may be a link 
                                                                                                                                                        
requirement was based on a current cost valuation; since 2001, valuations have been based on deprival value. 
From 2000-01 to 2004-05, the Australian port sector as a whole earned a rate of return on assets of about 6% per 
annum (Productivity Commission, Financial performance of government trading enterprises, 2006).   
9    Calculated from Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Flinders Ports Pty Ltd, Financial Report, 
2004-05. Unfortunately, the data are not sufficiently disaggregated to enable an assessment of the performance 
of individual ports. 
10   This is consistent with recommendations that port authorities be permitted to use a portion of their cash 
reserves for capital investment (Department for Planning and Infrastructure, 2006). 
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between private ownership and higher financial returns, but the difference does not appear to 
be significant based on these figures.  In any case, as New Zealand’s experience suggests, 
good financial performance benefiting shareholders may conflict with passing efficiency 
gains to port users (Tull and Reveley, 2001).   
 
One of the goals of Australia’s port reforms was to decrease costs and charges to port users 
and in response to this, most Australian ports have expressed a commitment to reduce prices.  
In order to facilitate a comparative assessment of trends in cost and charges to port users, 
Figures 1-8 in Appendix B show expenditure (including debt servicing costs) per unit of cargo 
($/tonne), and income per unit of cargo ($/tonne) in constant 1989-90 prices for the six 
principal ports between 1993-94 and 2004-05.  If performance were trending favourably, with 
port charges to customers decreasing and efficiency increasing, one would expect a decline in 
both revenues per unit of output and costs per unit of output.  It is important to note that the 
revenue and cost data relate to port authority services only; aggregate data on the revenues 
and costs of all port service providers are not available.  Due to the different characteristics of 
each port, it may be more instructive to compare trends over time rather than absolute levels 
of revenues and costs per unit of output. 
 
Table 2 below summarises the changes between 1993-94 and 2004-05, and shows that all 
ports except Dampier and Fremantle experienced falls (ranging from 15 to 30 per cent) in real 
costs per unit of cargo.  Furthermore, comparing 1993-94 and 2004-05, all ports except 
Fremantle experienced substantial falls (ranging from 23 to 40 per cent) in real revenue per 
unit of cargo.  Trends in unit costs and revenue at each port are shown in Figures 1 to 8 in 
Appendix B at the rear of this report. 
 
Table 2:  Changes in port authority cost and revenue comparing 1993-94 and 2004-05 
(1989/90 prices) 
 
Port Change in real cost per unit 
of cargo (%) 
Change in real revenue per 
unit of cargo (%) 
Albany -25 -23 
Broome NA NA 
Bunbury -21 -28 
Dampier 0 -40 
Esperance -30 -33 
Fremantle -2 -1 
Geraldton -28 -39 
Port Hedland -15 -33 
Notes: NA = not available.    Source: Appendix A. 
 
This evidence suggests that except at Fremantle, there were significant gains in operating 
efficiency over this period and most importantly, it appears the majority of the gains have 
been transferred to port users.  This seems to reflect a charging policy which does not seek to 
exploit market power.  In this regard, the Dampier Port Authority has stated: 
 
… the Authority’s financial goals are secondary to its role as a trade facilitator. To that 
end, the aim is to minimise revenue without affecting financial viability so as to provide 
the most cost-effective service to port users. (Dampier Port Authority (2004), p 14) 
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At Fremantle, comparing 1993-94 and 2000-01, cost and revenue per tonne of cargo fell by 
29 per cent and 20 per cent respectively in real terms, but since then the declining trend has 
reversed.  It is possible that the momentum of waterfront reform, which began earlier at 
Fremantle than other WA ports, has slowed.  However, as Figure 1 shows, the FPA, using a 
different methodology, claims that charges have fallen in real terms by almost 40 per cent 
from 1993-94 to 2004-05.11  Figure 1 also shows that since the early 1990s the waterfront 
reform process has successfully transformed the FPA from a loss making to a profitable 
organisation. 
 
Figure 1:  Fremantle Ports Operating Profit and Real Price Index, 1990-91 to 2005-06 
 
 
Source: Fremantle Port Authority. 
 
Other Non-financial indicators 
 
It is widely recognised that ports compete on non-price as well as price characteristics and 
aspects of service quality such as speed (turnround time) and reliability can be decisive in port 
choice. The timeliness and reliability of port services can be gauged by examining indicators 
such as turnround times and berth occupancy.  Ship turnround time captures the performance 
of a number of service providers including the port authority itself, pilots, tugs, stevedores 
                                                 
11   The FPA defines its real price index as “the weighted average price index deflated by the CPI for Perth. The 
average price equals the total of prices for individual Fremantle Ports’ services weighted by their contribution to 

















Op. Profit -10 -8.59 1.58 8.39 9.82 8.34 10.62 12.73 13.82 15.72 15.64 19.09 15.67 17.64 15.21 13.28 
RPI 100.0 94.2 83.3 84.1 80.0 78.8 76.1 68.8 65.5 62.4 61.2 60.2 58.6 
90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 
$ Millions Real Price Index
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and the labour force (SCNPMGTE, 1998, p. 264).  Unfortunately, data on turnround times are 
limited, especially for non-container ports not covered by data in Waterline.  
 
Table 1 reveals significant differences between ports in turnround times.  However, 
differences and variations in shipping and cargo volumes and composition limit the usefulness 
of a comparison based on absolute values. So it is more useful to examine the degree of 
variation and trends in this indicator of performance.  The ‘coefficient of variation’, which 
measures relative rather than absolute variation, provides a better although still crude 
indication of reliability.   
 
Data shown in the far right column of Table 1 show that turnround times are subject to more 
variation in Albany and Geraldton than in other ports.  The trend in average turnround times 
between 1993-94 and 2004-05 (shown in Appendix A) appears to have improved at 
Esperance and Geraldton, been static at Bunbury and Fremantle (container only) and slightly 
deteriorated at Albany.  Fremantle’s turnround times improved in the late 1990s but crept up 
after 2003.  Fremantle’s turnaround times for containers are not unreasonable compared with 
other ports in Australia and it is important to note that all container terminals are operated by 
private enterprise.  Again one interpretation is that nationally port reforms were beginning to 
lose their impetus.  
 
Data collected by the Australian Wheat Board Ltd on grain make it possible to standardise 
turnround times for differences between ports and for differences in average grain cargoes.  
Figure 2 illustrates average turnround time per 1,000 tonnes of grain lifted between 1991 and 
2000. The standardised turnround times have fluctuated from year to year with Fremantle 
performing close to the national average, Albany and Esperance usually performing above the 
national average and Geraldton below. There is no clearly discernable trend although 
Geraldton appears to have improved its performance in the late 1990s.   
 
Figure 1: Average turnround time per '000 tonnes of grain lifted, 1991-2000 
 
Source: Victorian Department of Infrastructure (2001), The next wave of Port Reform in Victoria, Appendix A, 
















Analysis of the performance of the privatised Victorian ports of Geelong and Portland shows 
that they performed close to the national average and “it is difficult to attribute any causation 
from the Victorian port reforms other than to note the variability of the Victorian ports’ 
performance has been reduced compared to the pre-reform period” (Victorian Department of 
Infrastructure (2001, Appendix A).  These data suggest that ownership of ports may not be a 
critical determinant of performance.  The Victorian regulatory regime which received an 
overall ‘good’ rating from Access Economics’ is narrowly focused on pricing and arguably 
has held back investment in publicly owned ports. 
 
There are major differences between WA ports in the scale and composition of trade and 
shipping flows and this complicates any comparisons of performance.  The last 
comprehensive review of WA ports was undertaken jointly by the Bureau of Transport 
Economics and the WA Director General of Transport in 1981 (BTE, 1981); it is noted that a 




An important aspect of ‘strategic port management’ is trade facilitation.  This includes 
facilitating and directly undertaking investment in port infrastructure to ensure a balance 
between ‘demand’ and port capacity.  In the words of the Prime Minister’s Exports and 
Infrastructure Taskforce (2005, pp 2 & 16): 
 
Australia’s exporters operate in highly competitive global markets. They are reliant on 
infrastructure investment that is undertaken in a timely way, not a time frame dictated 
by regulatory processes.  Waiting two or three years for regulatory decisions is as 
unacceptable as it is unnecessary….  The productivity of infrastructure assets is 
significantly affected by the extent to which investment in the infrastructure itself is 
consistent and coordinated with investment decisions being made by users. 
 
The relationship between demand (including latent demand) and capacity is difficult to 
measure directly (and beyond the scope of this research to do so).  However, two indicators 
may be useful in reaching preliminary conclusions on performance in this regard.  The first 
are the indicators of turnaround times shown in Table 1; the second are the trends in total 
tonnage processed through the key ports shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3:  Changes in port throughput comparing 1993-94 and 2004-05 
 
Port Cargo throughput (mt) 
1993-94 
Cargo throughput (mt) 
2004-05 
Change in cargo  
throughput (%) 
Albany 1.7 3.0 76.5 
Broome * 0.1 - 
Bunbury 7.5 12.0 60.0 
Dampier 60.5 95.8 58.3 
Esperance 1.3 7.8 500.0 
Fremantle 20.4 25.5 25.0 
Geraldton 2.9 5.5 89.7 
Port Hedland 53.3 108.5 103.6 
Note: *= less than 0.1mt.  Source: Appendix A. 
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With the exception of Broome all WA ports handled substantially increased cargo tonnages.  
Importantly, there is no evidence that rapid trade expansion has significantly outstripped the 
capacity of the infrastructure, and the quality of service provided has not attracted adverse 
public criticism from port users. The Fremantle Port Authority’s annual customer surveys 
report high levels of satisfaction with service delivery and value for money from its services 
(FPA 2007).   WA ports have also avoided the lengthy queues of ships waiting to load cargo 




This review of port performance does not claim to be comprehensive and gives only a 
snapshot of a complex situation.  Its purpose has been to provide an alternative wider 
perspective for assessing WA port authorities than was applied in the 2006 ‘scorecard’ on the 
economic regulation of infrastructure.  In contrast to the 2006 ‘scorecard’, in which the focus 
was solely on arrangements for regulation of third party access, the perspective provided here 
emphasises the broader set of regulatory arrangements enacted in legislation governing the 
management of WA’s port authorities, and the actual performance of these port authorities.   
 
The conclusions of this research are that the “very poor” scorecard rating given to WA ports 
is inappropriate.  The evidence shows that in the period examined in this report, major WA 
port authorities were providing levels of service which were reasonable compared with other 
ports in Australia.  The evidence presented here relating the of WA’s port authorities actual 
performance suggests there is no exclusive link between economic regulation and superior 
physical and economic performance.  Performance indicators discussed in section 4 of this 
report show there were significant gains in operating efficiency from 1993-94 to 2004-05 and 
that these gains were passed onto port users.  
 
The evidence presented in this report shows that the charges being made for services provided 
directly by port authorities were not excessive compared with other similar ports.  
Conversely, there is no evidence that WA port authorities were earning monopoly rents from 
their ownership and operation of WA’s principal ports.  The evidence also shows that a 
significant part of the financial benefits from reforms being made by major WA port 
authorities were being passed on to port users.   
 
While there is no regime for direct regulation of access to WA’s port infrastructure, there are 
two alternative statutory means by which objectives of such a regime can be achieved.  The 
first of these is the Port Authorities Act 1999, which requires a focus on economic efficiency 
through commercialisation, transparency and accountability, albeit potentially qualified by 
powers of government direction.  The second is the ability of government to request the WA 
Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) to examine the pricing, quality, business practices and 
compliance costs of non-regulated industries (assumed to include port authorities). 
 
In relation to ports the 2006 AusCID-sponsored report gives the highest ranking to States in 
which a moderate to high degree of port privatisation has occurred (Victoria and South 
Australia), in which prima facie there is a greater need for independent regulation, owing to 
the absence of government supervision through direct ownership. 
 
Overall, it is clear that the current model of public ownership, with ports acting as ‘strategic 
managers’ subject to statutory and governmental oversight, follows  world best practice in the 
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Notes for all tables: Definitions: return on assets = earnings before interest and tax and after abnormals (EBIT)/average total assets; dividend payout ratio = dividends paid or 
provided for/operating profit after tax; current ratio = current assets/ current liabilities; Debt/equity ratio = debt/total equity. 
Sources for all tables: Steering Committee on National Performance of Government Trading Enterprises, (SCNPGTE) Government trading enterprises performance 
indicators 1990-91 to 1994-95, 2 vols. (Canberra, 1996), BTCE Waterline, various issues, Productivity Commission Financial performance of government trading 
enterprises, various issues, Annual Reports of Albany, Broome, Bunbury, Dampier, Esperance, Fremantle, Geraldton and Port Hedland port authorities.  
 
Table A.1:  Selected performance indicators, Albany Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 16.2 6.2 9.9 10.8 3.3 9.2 8.5 -1.7 0.8 3.0 7.9 9.7 
Dividend payout 
ratio % 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.7 0.0 38.5 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Current ratio % 14.9 10.2 2.5 1.8 4.0 3.7 4.5 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 
Debt/ equity % 0.3 0.8 14.8 10.5 10.5 7.1 6.5 33.9 59.1 68.7 54.5 41.2 
Operating profit 
(before tax) $ million 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.3 0.6 2.2 2.3 -0.6 -0.1 -1.5 2.3 3.0 
Port authority 
costs/unit of cargo $/Tonne 1.61 2.02 2.07 1.8 2.37 1.79 2.04 3.32 2.71 3.34 1.62 1.61 
Port authority 
revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne 2.53 2.81 2.83 2.82 2.66 2.67 2.96 2.96 2.66 2.55 2.46 2.6 
Non-financial 




tonnes 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.5 1.7 1.6 2 2.8 3 
Containerised cargo ‘000 TEUs             
Average turnround 
time  Hours 61 60 85 124 63 77 75 84 73 80 137 100 
Average total 




Table A.2:  Selected performance indicators, Broome Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets %        0.2  -0.7  -1 
Dividend payout ratio %        0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Current ratio %        - 3.3 1.2 1.2 2.5 
Debt/ equity %        - 0 0 -0.2 57.5 
Operating profit (before tax) $ million        0.01 -0.2 -0.2  -0.4 
Port authority costs/unit of 
cargo $/Tonne        17.90 17.80 18.90   
Port authority revenue/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne        18.00 17.00 17.50   
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes     0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs        0.8 0.5 0.4   
Average turnround time 
(container ships) Hours             














Table A.3:  Selected performance indicators, Bunbury Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 11.9 12.2 8.3 5.2 6.1 4.1 5.9 7.4 5.7 6.6 5.7 6.0 
Dividend payout ratio % 3.1 2.8 0.0 0.0 11.5 10.2 35.5 30.0 50.0 50.0 46.1 55.4 
Current ratio % 386.0 1045.0 319.0 197.0 359.4 239.1 204.1 391.4 354.4 428.2 547.5 423.3 
Debt/ equity % 4.7 16.1 34.3 34.0 32.0 24.5 24.1 21.8 20.2 18.2 17.9 16.3 
Operating profit (before 
tax) $ million 4.2 5.2 3.5 2.1 2.9 1.9 4.4 6.1 4.8 5.6 4.8 5.3 
Port authority costs/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.22 1.25 1.34 1.40 0.81 0.82 0.95 0.94 1.06 
Port authority 
revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne 1.56 1.67 1.46 1.47 1.57 1.56 0.97 1.37 1.22 1.36 1.34 1.50 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 7.5 7.9 8.5 8.6 8.9 9.0 10.0 11.3 11.4 11.8 11.9 12.0 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs             
Average turnround time  Hours 34 37 40 43 36 42 40 36 35 36 40 43 
Average total 














 Table A.4:  Selected performance indicators, Dampier Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 4.5 0.4 2.1 4.2 2.8 1.6 2.5 3.0 -1.2 1.6 1.5 -1.8 
Dividend payout ratio % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -48.5 59.8 47.3 -3.3 
Current ratio % 1.2 2.2 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.5 5.0 6.7 692.2 368.5 29 41.6 
Debt/ equity % 5.7 30.1 24.6 18.7 14.9 0.0 7.41 0.0 0.0 0.0 71.5 235.9 
Operating profit (before 
tax) $ million 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.3 0.4 0.5 -1.0 
Port authority costs/unit of 
cargo $/Tonne 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Port authority revenue/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 60.5 66.6 67.2 72.2 75.7 71.3 82.6 81.4 82.7 92.2 88.9 95.8 
Containerised cargo ‘000 TEUs             
Average turnround time  Hours 22 26 25          















Table A.5:  Selected performance indicators, Esperance Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 12.3 11.4 16.3 12.3 14.4 6.6 7.2 6.6 8.6 6.2 8.0 8.8 
Dividend payout ratio % 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.8 125.5 21.1 20.0 0.0 0.0 76.9 52.0 61.3 
Current ratio % 133.0 140.0 264.0 122.0 253.0 245.0 159.0 42.0 75.0 100.0 176.6 213.2 
Debt/ equity % 99.5 93.8 115.3 92.3 77.2 56.9 50.7 146.8 236.7 224.4 206.5 187.1 
Operating profit (before 
tax) $ million 1.1 1.1 1.9 2.3 3.2 2.9 3 2.1 3.1 1.8 3.5 4.4 
Port authority costs/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne 3.46 3.37 3.01 3 2.79 2.85 2.84 3.03 2.92 3.55 3.14 2.98 
Port authority 
revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne 4.31 3.9 3.64 3.71 3.81 3.81 3.66 3.51 3.44 3.85 3.75 3.55 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.5 4.3 6.2 6 7.3 7.8 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs             
Average turnround time 
(container ships) Hours 54 45 42 51 47 57 48 40 42 38 42 44 
Average total 
employment 





Table A.6:  Selected performance indicators, Fremantle Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 14.3 15.7 14.6 14.9 20.0 17.1 15.6 13.5 14.9 13.0 11.9 10.5 
Dividend 
payout ratio % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 19.9 20.0 48.7 41.5 50.0 40.1 
Current ratio  92.8 78.1 99.6 112.4 121.3 119.6 105.5 150.0 160.4 107.9 118.9 135.5 
Debt/ equity % -248.3 -319.5 1490.2 109.1 64.9 38.8 22.9 26.8 32.6 25.9 24.5 42.5 
Operating profit (before 
tax) $ million 8.4 9.8 8.3 10.6 17.9 13.8 14.8 15.6 19.5 17.8 17.6 16.5 
Port authority costs/unit of 
cargo 
$/ 
Tonne 2.02 2.00 1.94 2.24 1.86 1.76 1.74 1.71 1.93 2.49 2.29 2.65 
Port authority revenue/unit 
of cargo 
$/ 
Tonne 2.49 2.46 2.52 2.41 2.44 2.34 2.37 2.40 2.78 3.25 2.96 3.30 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 20.4 20.1 21.9 18.3 21.8 23.5 23.4 22.5 22.7 23.5 25.9 25.5 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs 169.17 189.27 198.27 209.56 250.8 275.7 300.1 354.2 383.1 431.7 466.0 468 
Average turnround time 
(container ships) Hours 27 30 30.7 24.8 24 23 24 22 21.5 25 28.5 27.5 














Table A.7:  Selected performance indicators, Geraldton Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 20.3 15.2 19.1 13.6 15.5 5.4 10.5 2.8 2.1 0.9 6.0 6.8 
Dividend payout ratio % 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 16.7 105.4 0.0 1800.0 0.0 117.8 3.5 0.0 
Current ratio % 363.0 267.0 269.0 213.0 252.0 488.0 266.0 275.0 131.2 76.0 128.7 219.5 
Debt/ equity % 101.8 87.1 120.0 95.0 62.0 51.0 51.4 48.9 46.2 441.2 504.1 483.8 
Operating profit (before 
tax) 
$ 
million 2.6 1.7 2.5 2.7 1.9 0.8 2.8 0.2 0.0 0.1 4.0 2.8 
Port authority costs/unit of 
cargo $/Tonne 4.30 4.79 4.28 4.21 3.70 3.08 2.41 3.57 3.83 3.96 3.41 4.22 
Port authority revenue/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne 5.17 5.38 4.97 5.00 4.22 3.29 3.12 3.64 3.85 4.00 4.32 4.73 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 2.9 2.9 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 4.4 5.5 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs             
















Table A.8:  Selected performance indicators, Port Hedland Port Authority 
 
Financial indicators Units 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Return on assets % 2.0 2.3 2.9 2.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 -324 6.0 6.6 4.7 4.8 
Dividend payout ratio % 7.7 6.7 18.6 36.4 21.4 55.6 28.6 -0.3 50.0 50.0 96.4 50.7 
Current ratio % 4.6 5.3 4.9 5.7 7.1 6.3 6.9 3.3 378.5 285.7 256.9 100.3 
Debt/ equity % 3.3 3.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Operating profit (before 
tax) $ million 2.6 3.0 4.3 3.4 1.9 2.0 2.2 -137.3 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.4 
Port authority costs/unit of 
cargo $/Tonne 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 
Port authority revenue/unit 
of cargo $/Tonne 0.2 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 
Non-financial indicators              
Total cargo throughput million 
tonnes 53.3 60.3 63.9 68.3 69.8 67.2 65.4 72.9 72.4 81.4 89.8 108.5 
Containerised cargo ‘000 
TEUs             
Average turnround time  Hours             






Appendix B:  Comparisons of costs and revenues of WA port authorities, 
1993-4 – 2004-05 
 










































Port authority costs/unit of cargo $/Tonne Port authority revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne
















































































Port authority real costs/unit of cargo $/Tonne Port authority real revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne
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Port authority  real costs/unit of cargo $/Tonne Port authority real revenue/unit of cargo $/Tonne















































Port authority cost per tonne of cargo Port authority revenue per tonne of cargo
